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  24 May 1955 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 64-55 COMMUNIST PROSPECTS IN MALAYA AND BRITISH BORNEO Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 24 May 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This ...

  Photo: The internet Many Malaysians today may not be aware of a sinister plot by communist terrorists led by Chin Peng to sabotage the declaration of independence for Malaya. On August 20, 1957, Lieutenant Hassan Osman, a key military officer, played a crucial role in safeguarding Malaya’s stability in the run-up to independence. At that time, Platoon 12 of Company D from the 5th Royal Malay Regiment (RAMD) was tasked with monitoring the area under Company C, 6 RAMD in Rawang. Their mission was to conduct detailed reconnaissance of suspected communist activities, as there were fears of an ambush intended to disrupt the impending declaration of independence. Upon receiving vital intelligence, Lieutenant Hassan sought and was granted permission to undertake further investigation. He and his team proceeded to the Waterfall Rubber Estate, where communist activity had been reported. Their suspicions were confirmed—communist forces were indeed present. With careful planning, Lieutenant...

  SECRET Problem To assess the will and ability of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to resist Communist political and military pressures in the eventnnof an early Communist victory in Indochina. SCOPE This paper will examine political, psychological, and military conditions in Thailand, Burma, and Malays in order to determine (a) to what extent these countries would be willing and able to resist political and indirect military pressures that would result from the establishment of Communist control in Indochina; (b) their capabilities for repelling actual military attack; (c) the possibilities for concerted action among them; and (d) the effect on these countries of large-scale employment of Chinese Communist armed forces in Southeast Asia, (Refer to Terms of Reference for NIE 20 issued by the Central Intelligence Agency 17 January 1951; only sections allocated to State/OIR are treated below.) QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM I. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT IN THAILAND OF A COMMUNIST VICTORY...