24 May 1955
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 64-55
COMMUNIST PROSPECTS IN MALAYA AND
BRITISH BORNEO
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 24 May 1955. Concurring were the Special
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G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director
of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff.
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Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside
their jurisdiction.
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COMMUNIST PROSPECTS IN MALAYA AND
BRITISH BORNEO
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the extent of and prospects for
Communist influence in the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo,
Sarawak, and Brunei over approximately the next five years.
ASSUMPTION
No war involving the major powers develops
during the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Under present circumstances, the
British-led security forces in the Federation of Malaya almost certainly will
be able to contain the Communist guerrilla force, but not to annihilate it or
prevent occasional small-unit operations. If the UK granted full
self-government and withdrew from the Federation in the next few years, we
believe that the Communists, who are about 95 percent Malayan Chinese, almost
certainly would take over the territory. However, we believe that the UK, with
the strong backing of Australia and New Zealand, will not consent to Malayan
independence or withdraw its power until it believes that the Communist
insurgence has been reduced to a police problem that the Malayan forces can
themselves control. (Paras. 21, 27, 29)
2. We believe that the Communists will
follow a policy of subordinating guerrilla warfare to political penetration and
subversion, avoiding actions which would antagonize any large sections of local
opinion, although the broad policy of the Malayan Communist Party will almost
certainly be guided by the international Communist movement. (Para.22)
3. If Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fell to
the Communists, and Communist pressure were being directly exerted upon
Thailand and Burma, Communist activities in Malaya would be intensified and the
general morale of non-Communists in Malaya lowered. Many non-Communist Asians
would feel that the Manila Pact was proving ineffective against the expansion
of Communism in Southeast Asia. Many more local Chinese would cooperate with
the Communists, while some now supporting the government would adopt a
wait-and-see attitude. However, we believe that the British authorities could
and probably would cope with this more difficult situation. At the same time,
the British would seek to determine US intentions with respect to the defense
of Thailand and Burma. (Para. 36)
4. If, in addition to the foregoing
developments, Indonesia also became Communist, Australia might be less disposed
to commit substantial forces in Malaya. Nevertheless, the British would
continue to hold Malaya until they estimated that the forces that could
prudently be committed to its defense were insufficient to maintain the
authority of a non-Communist government. In such event, the British and
Australian determination to continue their resistance would be dependent upon
the kind and amount of support which the US offered them. (Para. 37)
5. In any event, if the Communists came to
power in Thailand, recognition would be widespread that the Manila Pact had
failed in its purpose. The security situation in Malaya would quickly become
critical. Maintenance of border security and preservation of internal control
would require an enormous effort. In these circumstances, we believe that the
participating Commonwealth powers would foresee the inevitable loss of Malaya,
unless prompt and substantial US aid was forthcoming. With such aid, including
an agreement to commit US military forces if necessary, the Commonwealth powers
probably would elect to defend Malaya.1 (Para 38)
6. Over the next few years the UK intends
to continue Malaya's gradual advance toward self-government. The UK envisages
the eventual grant of internal self-government, coupled with the union of the
Federation and Singapore, followed some time later by independence. The
ultimate objective appears to be the creation of a new Malayan Dominion, in
which British economic and strategic interests will be preserved. The British
program almost certainly will fail to satisfy the more extreme nationalists,
who will probably force some acceleration in that program. (Paras. 28-29)
7. Singapore's future is bound up with that
of the Federation. Some expansion of Communist strength and capabilities among
Singapore's overwhelmingly Chinese population appears likely over the next five
years, although the Communists almost certainly will be unable to take over the
colony while the British retain control in the Federation. Communist
capabilities probably will be limited to instigating sporadic strikes,
disorderly demonstrations, and acts of assassination and sabotage. (Paras.
46-47)
8. In British
Borneo, composed of Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei, Communist activity is at
a low level, and British control almost certainly will remain firm through
1960. (Paras. 49-50)
1 The Director of Intelligence, The
Joint Staff, believes that all of this paragraph after the second sentence
should be deleted and the fol- lowing be substituted:
"In
this situation, even though border se- curity could be maintained at an
enormous effort, British internal control of Malaya would have been lost as a
result of a swing to active support of Communist operations by a large number
of formerly pro-British or uncommitted Chinese and Malays. In this
circumstance, the introduction of US aid, including military forces, would
probably not be effective in recovering Malaya from Communism and would
corroborate in the eyes of Asians Communist charges of US imperialism and
support of colonialism."
DISCUSSION
I. THE FEDERATION OF
MALAYA
Background
9. Recent Political
History. The Federation of
Malaya, under the protection of the UK, includes nine Malay states and the
Settlements of Penang and Malacca. In accordance with British colonial policy,
the UK has encouraged increasing participation by Asians in the administration
of government and has granted them fairly steady progress toward the goal of
self-government. Although British authorities retain ultimate control, most of
the smaller jobs in the public service and a substantial number of senior ones,
including some carrying ministerial responsibilities, have been given to
Asians. There has apparently been general satisfaction with the pace of
political growth, although lately political leaders, as well as student groups
and some intellectuals, have begun to demand that the grant of full
self-government be hastened. Over the past year or so, political consciousness,
political activity, and political demands have expanded significantly.
10. Within the past two years, the first elections to
municipal and state legislatures have been held and, under pressure from local
political leaders, the British have advanced to 27 July 1955 the first election
of members to a federal legislature. The democratic political parties are
immature. They were established rapidly to meet the purposes of the elections,
and each embraces a wide variety of views on political and economic questions.
Following the outbreak of the Communist insurrection in the spring of 1948, the
Communist Party was outlawed.
11. The Population. Of the Federation’s approximately six million
people, about 50 percent are Malays, some 38 percent are Chinese, over 10
percent are Indians, and less than one percent are Europeans. The races differ
widely in culture, religion, and economic interests. Frictions among them have
rarely been serious, but they are suspicious of each other, and they have
little social intercourse.
Most of the Malays are
Moslems, inhabit the rural areas, and lack the ambitions and skills of the
other races. With very few exceptions, they have not been attracted to
Communism. The Chinese largely dominate Malayan economic activity. Substantial
numbers of them, especially the youth, are attracted by Mao’s “New Democracy” —
or feel threatened by it — and they are the sources of local Communist
strength. A small minority, mostly within the older generation, actively
support the Chinese Nationalist government. However, the great majority are
passively anti-Communist and conservative, for reasons of economic security. At
the same time, they prefer to withhold forthright cooperation with the
government against the Communists so long as they consider a Communist
take-over to be possible. The Malayan Chinese are the wealthiest of the
overseas Chinese communities. The Indians are mostly laborers in the rubber
industry, though a few of these have risen to important positions in the trade
union movement. Communism has had little appeal for the Indians in Malaya.
12. Over the years, the British have followed a
policy of attempting to balance power among the races. In practice, this has
meant a series of measures to fortify Malay rights against the shrewder, more
aggressive Chinese. For example, the British authorities have reserved large
land areas and insured a near-monopoly of government jobs for the Malays. The
British hope that over the long term the Malays' aptitudes for improving their
standing will be raised by education and training programs. Meanwhile, such
discriminatory actions tend to promote racial feeling, and to complicate
development of a common spirit of unity and of national, as against racial,
loyalties. Nevertheless, during the past year, there has been increasing
evidence of interracial cooperation and compromise, particularly in the
political sphere. Except for the Communist insurrection, there has been
virtually no violent anticolonialism.
13. The Economy. The Federation economy depends largely on the
export of natural rubber and tin, with rubber accounting for 50 percent of the
value of exports and tin 16 percent. The Federation produces approximately
one-third of world supplies of those commodities, and it is extremely
vulnerable to adverse fluctuations in their international market prices. In
addition, production of iron ore has now surpassed one million long tons per
year. The strategic mineral, columbite, has been discovered in the tin-bearing
region, and uranium-bearing ore deposits are being investigated to ascertain
whether they are economically exploitable. Malayan per capita income is the
highest in the Far East, about US $258 in 1950. The Federation is dependent on
imports for more than 50 percent of its food staple, rice, most of which is
purchased from Burma and Thailand. Its second important import is textiles.
Over two-thirds of its trade each way is with the Commonwealth. Trade with the
Sino-Soviet Bloc is small. As the principal net contributor to the Sterling
Area, the Federation is an important source of British economic strength.
14. The struggle against the Communist insurrection
has imposed a sustained heavy economic burden since 1948. The UK has borne the
whole cost of the British forces employed against the Communists, the
equivalent of about US $182 million per year, and has also made direct grants
to the Federation government for military uses, totalling the equivalent of
about US $40 million since 1949. Nevertheless, military allocations by the
Federation over the past five years have averaged more than 27 percent of the
annual internal budgets. The 1954 cost of the struggle to the Federation was
the equivalent of more than US $67 million. Although the Communists have failed
over the past seven years to disrupt the Malayan economy, they have hindered
economic development that would normally have taken place. Nevertheless,
programs are afoot for diversifying the economy, improving and expanding
agriculture, providing more electrical power and better communications, and
generally expanding the national income.
The Communist
Insurrection
15. The Communist rebel forces, now known as the
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), began operations in the spring of 1948,
following an international Communist conference in Calcutta earlier that year.
The MRLA has since maintained forces at a strength of some 4,500–6,000 under
arms. Its supporting agency is the Min Yuen, a net of Communist cells spread
across the country, mainly in villages and on the jungle fringe, which with an
estimated strength in excess of 10,000 performs supply, intelligence, and
recruiting services. There are an unknown number of additional cooperators
throughout Malaya, some sympathetic but most influenced by intimidation and
hopes of insuring future safety, who aid the MRLA with food and funds. The
subversive complex is composed almost wholly of Malayan Chinese; the leaders
and hard core are largely foreign-born Chinese. The Malayan Communist Party is
a part of the international Communist organization. It probably receives some
financial support from the local Bank of China, which is Peiping-controlled.
The MRLA, which has required relatively small amounts of arms and ammunition,
relies heavily for such supplies on stocks retained from the Communists’
guerrilla struggle against the Japanese during World War II, and on those captured
or stolen locally. Only very limited quantities appear to have come from
outside, either across the Thailand border or by sea.
16. The original plan of the rebellion appears to
have been the “liberation” of Malaya within a 10 year period and the ultimate
establishment of a Malayan Peoples Republic. The struggle was to begin with
guerrilla warfare, then become a war of movement with operations in strength,
and end up with the capture of cities and general revolution. In fact, the
rebellion never passed beyond the guerrilla stage. The Communist rebels reached
their peak in 1951, when more than 6,000 incidents of violence were recorded,
popular confidence in the protective power of the Federation government widely
declined, and the Communists found it relatively easy to obtain needed food,
money, and information. At this point, the security measures of the British
authorities in both the military and civil fields began to take effect.
17. By early 1952 the British had built up land
forces composed of some 13,000 British troops, 10,000 Gurkhas, and 12,000 Malay
and colonial troops. They had raised the police force, largely Malays under
British officers, to a strength of over 50,000, and had begun to arm a Home
Guard which ultimately reached three or four times that strength. In addition,
they had built up a small tactical air force to carry out air support and air
resupply missions, and a modest navy for harbor and coastal patrol. Large-scale
military operations were mounted against the MRLA in successive areas, and
military pressures upon the rebels were maintained. At the same time rigorous
food controls were imposed throughout the countryside — at the cost of some
hardship to the civilian population — which made food supplies even more
difficult for the MRLA to obtain. A large resettlement program was pressed
forward for moving from the jungle fringe the numerous Chinese squatters who
were the major source of the Communists’ supplies. With forceful measures when
necessary, some 560,000 Chinese eventually were relocated in 546 “New
Villages,” each with new schools, utilities, and police protection.
18. In 1952 and 1953 the initiative passed
increasingly to the Federation government. The MRLA was pressed back deep into
the jungle. Its supply and food problems became crucial as easy access to the
civil population was denied it. Its morale slipped somewhat, and surrenders of
rebels increased. In 1952 recorded MRLA operations dropped to about 3,700, and
in 1953, to less than 1,200. The trend had continued downward, and casualties
among loyal civilians and the security forces have fallen appreciably, as have
casualties among the Communists.
19. The reduction in guerrilla activity was brought
about only partly by military pressure. In part this reduction resulted from a
revision of tactics by the Communists themselves. They abandoned their
indiscriminate terrorism, on the grounds that it was antagonizing the Malayan
people, and limited their actions to attacks on police posts, infantry patrols,
and large plantation and mining establishments, mainly to capture arms and
maintain MRLA morale. They set up training and indoctrination camps deep in the
jungle, and began to use the jungle-dwelling aborigines as sentinels, scouts,
and food-suppliers. With the rise in Communist China’s prestige, particularly
since the mid-1954 Geneva Conference, and with the Viet Minh success in
Indochina, surrenders of Communist guerrillas initially fell appreciably, and
the morale and discipline of the rank-and-file improved. Concluding that a
broad civil base was necessary to carry forward the revolution, the Communists
embarked on a major effort to win popular sympathy, including that of Indians
and Malays; to infiltrate and subvert the native Home Guard and police; to
penetrate and develop fronts in legal political, trade union, and educational
organizations, and to arouse popular colonial sentiments. It is notable that,
according to captured documents, the Communists are cautioned in the creation
of united fronts not to permit Chinese leadership of the party to be
jeopardized.
20. The Federation government also has lately begun a
switch in military tactics, with the aim of increasing the pressure on the
MRLA. It is undertaking to base ground force units for months at a time in
Communist-infested areas deep in the jungle, with the mission of disrupting the
Communist base organizations, inflicting casualties, cutting communications,
and winning away the aborigines. Meanwhile, many of the army’s responsibilities
in inhabited areas are being turned over to the police and civil authorities in
order to maximize the number of troops available for jungle deployment. On the
psychological front the authorities are widely publicizing lenient terms for
defectors, and rewards for civilians aiding in the capture or killing of
Communist guerrillas. Recently, the surrender rate has risen slightly.
Outlook
21. The Communist
Insurrection. Under present
circumstances, Federation security forces almost certainly will be able to
contain the MRLA, but not to annihilate it or prevent occasional small-unit
operations. Security forces will remain at approximately present strengths,
although there will be some changes in their composition as Australian and New
Zealand contingents arrive. The British intend to maintain offensive pressure
on the Communist military force, and will continue to hold the military
initiative. But the Malayan jungle will continue to impose great difficulties
for security force operations, and we believe that a situation of virtual
stalemate will persist.
22. The broad policy of the Malayan Communist Party
almost certainly will continue to be guided by the international Communist
movement. However, we believe that guerrilla operations will continue to be
subordinated to political infiltration and subversion, rather than actions
which would antagonize any large sections of local opinion. The MRLA probably
will concentrate on self-preservation, recruitment, training, and
indoctrination of personnel. Its supply problems, especially that of food, will
remain serious, and morale accordingly will be damaged, particularly if the
British succeed in intensifying the pressures on the guerrillas. On the other
hand, Communist successes elsewhere in Asia — in Vietnam, for example — almost
certainly would improve the morale of the guerrillas, and would somewhat ease
their difficulties in obtaining supplies by covert means from the population.
The fall of Thailand to Communist influence would require a major diversion of
military strength for border defense, and would increase to a critical degree
the problems of the security forces.
Security forces now
consist of:
- 13,000 British troops
- 10,000 Gurkhas
- 13,500 Malay and colonial troops
- 50,000 Police
- 200,000 Home Guard
- Plus air and naval forces
23. Probable Political
Developments. Focusing on the
July elections for a new federal Legislative Council, political activity in the
Federation has stepped up appreciably. The major competing political
organizations are the Alliance, composed of the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA); the Malayan
Indian Congress, which is seeking to affiliate with the Alliance; the Party
Negara (PN); and the Labor Party of Malaya (LPM).
24. The Alliance was formed by UMNO and MCA more as a
vehicle of political expediency than as an expression of common views and
interests. The UMNO, which itself embraces conservative and increasingly potent
leftist wings, looks to its alliance with the Chinese as providing a source of
funds and votes and also as demonstrating that racial unity which the British
have postulated as prerequisite to independence. The MCA regards collaboration
with the Malays as the best way of obtaining political influence and of
preserving Chinese interests in an eventually independent Malaya. However, many
MCA members are alarmed by the UMNO's demand for nearly self-government, which
is the main electioneering platform of the Alliance. The Alliance provides the
most outspoken opposition to British political policies, and pursues the most
strongly nationalist line of all the active legal parties. With the best
grass-roots organization, apparently the most appealing campaign platform, and
a record of sweeping successes in local and state elections, the Alliance will
probably emerge victorious in the federal elections.
25. The Party Negara is more conservative than the Alliance. It favors
a more cautious approach to self-government, and cooperates with the colonial
administration. It enjoys the support of the sultans and, unobtrusively, of the
British authorities, but its popular backing seems small, and it almost
certainly cannot challenge the Alliance's political supremacy. The Labor
Party attacks the Alliance as a "marriage of convenience," and
the Chinese component as "capitalistic" and as containing elements of
doubtful loyalty.
It attacks Negara as
“British stooges.” It represents itself as the defender of the working classes,
and the supporter of the welfare state measures of social democracy. The Labor
Party is numerically and financially weak, and ineptly led, but it is likely to
increase in importance in the coming years. The leaders of all three parties
are anti-Communist, but they tend to be complacent about Communist infiltration
and subversion tactics.
26. The new federal Legislative Council will be
composed of 52 popularly elected members and 46 British-appointed
representatives. The constitutional term of the new legislature is four years.
Excepting financial, legal, foreign affairs, and defense posts, which will
remain in British hands, the Executive Council (Cabinet) will be appointed by
the High Commissioner after consultation with the successful party leader or
leaders.
27. It is likely that the British authorities will be
compelled to grant further constitutional advances toward self-government
before the end of the legislative term. With the steady increase in political
activity and political consciousness, the tide of nationalism is running ever
more strongly in this last large colonial territory of the West on the Eurasian
continent. Independence is not an issue between the British and the Malayans,
since there is common agreement that it will be granted eventually. However,
the pace of Malaya’s advance toward self-government is the foremost issue, and
it will remain so. The British have repeatedly asserted that they would not
grant full self-government and withdraw their power until the Communists had
been defeated and a “durable” harmony among the races established. Malayan
leaders have urged the British to agree on a time-table for turning over
self-government. The demands with regard to timing vary; the earliest which the
Alliance has enunciated is that independence, or agreement about it, be reached
by mid-1959, with intermediate steps taking place during the intervening years.
28. The ultimate British objectives are the
attachment of an independent Malayan Dominion to the Commonwealth, and the
preservation of British economic and strategic interests. For the British, the
key problem is to advance the Malayans politically at a pace neither so slow as
to destroy Malayan trust in British intentions and drive them into disorderly
and revolutionary activities, nor so fast as to undermine sound administration,
order, and the defenses against the Communists. The UK envisages the eventual
grant of internal self-government, coupled with a merger with Singapore,
followed some years later by independence.
29. The British probably will grant a succession of
small advances toward autonomy over the next few years. For example, while
retaining control of foreign relations, defense, finance, and military
operations against the guerrillas, they probably will increase Malayan
responsibilities in connection with public administration and social, economic,
and security policy-making; and possibly even agree to a wholly elected federal
legislature. Almost certainly the British program will fail to satisfy those
who will agitate against the British and perhaps produce occasional strife,
abetted by Communists. The nationalists will probably succeed in forcing some
acceleration in the program, but we believe that the British will not consent
to Malayan independence until they believe that the Communist insurgency has
been reduced to a police problem that the Malayan forces can themselves
control.
30. For the defense of the Federation the British are
in process of training local military units. In addition, to advance their
strategic objectives in the area, the British are developing three air bases in
the Federation (and one in Singapore) capable of supporting jet bomber
operations and have obtained military commitments from both New Zealand and
Australia for Malayan defense. The British hope for an eventual mutual defense
agreement with the new dominion, including the preservation of base rights.
31. If the UK granted full self-government and
withdrew from Malaya in the next few years, we believe that the Communists
would almost certainly take over the country. Malayan forces, now only seven
battalions strong and lacking native leadership, could not be built up
sufficiently to contain the guerillas, and civilian resistance to subversion
would crumble.
32. Communist
Prospects. Certain important
factors are operating to the benefit of the Communists, and probably will
continue. First among these is the powerful attraction of Communist China
itself for many Malayan-born Chinese, particularly among the youth, many of
whom are going back to China as students or visitors. Among other Malayan
Chinese, who are basically antipathetic to Communism, there is the fear of
retribution for failure to cooperate, if the Communists should eventually take
over Malaya. There is also the coincidence of the latest Communist tactics with
rising Malay nationalism: Nationalists and Communists can share a common
anticolonial, anti-British platform. Moreover, among the Malays there appears
to be increasing complacency about the Communist threat, and the passivity of
the government is largely responsible. The Alliance has stated that, if
elected, it will press the reluctant British authorities to offer amnesty to
the guerrillas, with a choice of rehabilitation or repatriation to China.
33. The Communist tactics of penetration and
subversion have made some headway over the past two to three years. The
Communists have had considerable success in penetrating local Chinese schools,
and in turning Chinese youth against military service. There is some
penetration of the Home Guard in small towns and rural areas. Communist
influence is apparent in the left wing of the UMNO, especially in that party's
youth organization, where the most extreme anti-British and anticolonial
sentiments emerge.
34. However, important factors are also working to
the disadvantage of the Communists. The Party is outlawed, and it cannot
operate in the open. Moreover, none of the international Communist front
organizations is known to be represented in Malaya. The Communists remain
widely unpopular primarily because of their earlier indiscriminate policy of
terrorism. Their organization in the main towns appears to be weak, and the
necessity to coerce the population to obtain supplies for the guerrilla forces
hampers Communist political work. Being largely Chinese, the Communists have
not had much success in overcoming the racial prejudice of the Malay and Indian
communities. No effective "united fronts" have yet been created.
Trade union penetration has been sharply limited. Finally, the British
authorities almost certainly will continue to advertise and demonstrate their
intention to retain ultimate power in Malaya—while gradually turning over civil
responsibilities to local leaders—until the Communist threat has been extinguished.
In the absence of important Communist successes abroad, these actions are
likely to check defections of the fence-sitting Malayan Chinese, who are moved
less by ideology and sentiment than by power realities. So far the only
significant large Chinese political party, the MCA, has remained on the right
side of Communist efforts.
35. Serious economic setbacks, particularly a
substantial and protracted drop in the prices of natural rubber and tin, would
enlarge Communist opportunities for trouble-making. However, if Malayan
prosperity declined seriously, the UK probably would provide some economic aid
to minimize repercussions.
36. If Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fell to the
Communists, and Communist pressure were being directly exerted upon Thailand
and Burma, Communist activities in Malaya would be intensified and the general
morale of non-Communists in Malaya lowered. Many non-Communist Asians would
feel that the Manila Pact was proving ineffective against the expansion of
Communism in Southeast Asia. Many more local Chinese would cooperate with the
Communists, while some now supporting the government would adopt a wait-and-see
attitude. However, we believe that the British authorities could and probably
would cope with this more difficult situation. At the same time, the British
would seek to determine US intentions with respect to the defense of Thailand
and Burma.
37. If, in addition to the foregoing developments,
Indonesia also became Communist, Australia might be less disposed to commit
substantial forces in Malaya. Nevertheless, the British would continue to hold
Malaya until they estimated that the forces that could prudently be committed
to its defense were insufficient to maintain the authority of a non-Communist
government. In such an event, the British and Australian determination to
continue their resistance would be dependent upon the kind and amount of support
which the US offered them.
38. In any event, if the
Communists came to power in Thailand, recognition would be widespread that the
Manila Pact had failed in its purpose. The security situation in Malaya would
quickly become critical. Maintenance of border security and preservation of internal
control would require an enormous effort. In these circumstances, we believe
that the participating Commonwealth powers would foresee the inevitable loss of
Malaya, unless assisted by substantial US aid and/or a willingness to commit US
military forces if necessary. The Commonwealth powers probably would elect to
defend Malaya.3
3. The Director of
Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that all this paragraph after the
second sentence should be deleted and the following be substituted:
“In this situation,
even though border security could be maintained at an enormous effort, British
internal control of Malaya would have been lost as a result of a swing to
active support of Communist operations by a large number of formerly
pro-British or uncommitted Chinese and Malays. In this circumstance, the
introduction of US aid, including military forces, would probably not effective
in recovering Malaya from Communism and would corroborate in the eyes of Asian
Communist charges of US imperialism and support of colonialism.”
SINGAPORE
Background
39. Singapore was organized as a separate Crown
Colony after World War II. Since then the British authorities have granted to
the colony more rapid advances toward local self-government than to the
Federation, culminating in the election on 2 April 1955 of a majority of the
Legislative Council and the subsequent establishment of a native majority in
the Executive Council. However, the British authorities, headed by the governor,
retain an ultimate veto in all important sectors of public affairs and they
retain full control of internal security matters, foreign affairs, finance, and
defense. It is British policy to retain these powers until the eventual union
of the colony with the Federation.
40. Of Singapore’s approximately 1.1 million
population, some 79 percent are Chinese, 13 percent Malays, 7 percent Indian,
and 1 percent Europeans. In addition to having numerical superiority, the
Chinese dominate economic activity in Singapore as in the Federation. The
loyalties of most are uncertain; probably the majority have been conservative
and anti-Communist, but the realities of power are more important to them than
principles. Many will continue to hedge their positions according to
developments in the Far East. A large part of Chinese youth is attracted by the
appeals of Communist China, and vulnerable to local Communist agitators.
41. Singapore has enjoyed a fairly stable prosperity
in the postwar period, despite fluctuation in the prices of natural rubber and
tin. Its marketing and primary processing facilities for raw materials have
been constantly busy, and its facilities as a world trade center have continued
to attract traders throughout a wide area of Asia. Moreover, the colony
possesses numerous active secondary industries, which have contributed to a
moderate economic expansion. Government finances have usually shown annual surpluses,
and a substantial monetary reserve has been built. Welfare measures have begun
to be expanded. Although unemployment may increase somewhat as a result of the
population’s rapid growth, emigration to the Federation can offer some relief,
and no serious, protracted economic decline is in prospect for the next few
years.
42. The Communists. Singapore has long been an organizational center
for Malayan Communist activities. It is a source of some food and arms for use
in the Federation, and it may be a rest center for guerrilla leaders. The
Communist Party in Singapore numbers about 200, and has an estimated 1,800
sympathizers, nearly all Chinese. It is under direction of the Malayan
Communist Party.
43. As in the Federation, Singapore Communists
undertook a program of terrorism and violence in 1948, and after 1951
subordinated such tactics to infiltration and subversion. Intensive police work
and comprehensive surveillance of suspected subversives, together with
political and social measures, have comprised the Singapore government’s
program for countering the Communist threat. A force of some 5,000 police and
special constables, officered by the British, was built up, and British ground
forces were raised to 12,500. The very small Royal Malayan Navy is based on,
and financed by, Singapore.
44. At present the Communists are engaged in
infiltrating Chinese youth groups and Chinese schools, and they have registered
considerable success. Moreover, pro-Communist students are succeeding in
intimidating and disorganizing those who are anti-Communist. Agitators helped
organize student strikes against compulsory registration for military service,
and resistance to government measures regulating schools and youth
associations. Chinese youths in increasing numbers are going to China for
higher education, and some are returning to Singapore. The Communists played a
large part in obstructing establishment of a western-oriented Chinese
university. They have had limited success in penetrating some trade unions,
particularly the dockers. They recently demonstrated their power to exploit a
union grievance by organizing a large-scale disorder, in which Chinese students
combined with strikers to paralyze a section of the city. The extreme left wing
legal political party appears to have been penetrated. The Communists appear to
have been increasingly successful in intensifying anti-British sentiment, but
not as yet any strong and sustained anti-US sentiment, particularly since
rubber prices have regained satisfactory levels and demand for tin continues
good.
Outlook
45. Political. Of the party and independent candidates who ran
in April for the 25 elected seats of the 32-seat Legislative Council, leftists
achieved a success that surprised even their leaders. The conservative parties
captured only six seats. On the extreme left, the Communist-influenced Peoples
Action Party won three seats. The Labor Front, moderate socialist in
orientation, gained 10 seats, and its leader has formed the colonial Cabinet
under the governor. The Labor Front campaigned on promises to expand
government-financed welfare state measures, to achieve union with the
Federation, to seek rapid advance toward independence for Malaya within the
Commonwealth, and to end the emergency regulations under which the government
has fought Communist activity.
46. However, apart from the weakening of social
reforms, the Labor Front probably will be unable to carry out its program very
rapidly. Singapore’s future is bound up with that of the Federation, yet early
union with the Federation probably will be opposed by Federation Malays,
fearing that addition of Singapore’s Chinese to the Federation’s would result
in the Malays being outnumbered and outvoted. Until the Communist menace has
subsided, the British authorities and moderates in the Council almost certainly
will block any attempts substantially to change the emergency regulations.
Moreover, the problem of daily administration, broader governmental
responsibilities, and political maneuvering will absorb much of the energies of
the local political leaders.
47. Communist
Prospects. Some expansion of
Communist strength and capabilities in Singapore appears likely, although the
Communists almost certainly will remain unable to take over the colony while
the British retain control in the Federation. As long as Communist China
appears to grow in strength and prestige, retains its romantic appeal, and
offers free education to overseas Chinese, Chinese youth, anti-Communist
measures in the psychological field may be expected to have little impact.
Likewise, most Chinese probably will remain noncommittal on the Communist
issue, so long as they fear the possibility of a Communist sweep of Southeast
Asia, or feel intimidated by local terrorists. However, the government, using
its emergency powers, and with the support of anti-Communist leaders, probably
will prevent the Communists from gaining full control of important mass
organizations, except for Chinese student groups. Communist capabilities
probably will be limited to instigating sporadic strikes, disorderly demonstrations,
and acts of assassination and sabotage. The British-led police will continue to
maintain intensive pressure on the Communists. British military forces will
remain available for emergencies. In addition, part-time training of local
conscripts is under way, and those are to be organized into 10 small ground
force units by the end of 1956.
III. BRITISH BORNEO
Background
48. British Borneo,
composed of the colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo, and the protectorate of
Brunei, is politically tranquil.
The area contains about
675,000 natives and 235,000 Chinese. Each of the territories is ruled under
British Colonial Office direction, and there is virtually no internal pressure
for political development. Economic trends in each have been moderately favorable,
especially in Brunei, which is prospering from the expanding production of its
rich oil fields.
49. Communist activity is
at a low level. Though the Party is banned, there is some evidence of Communist
penetration in Chinese schools and some propaganda among oil field workers in
Brunei.
Outlook
50. British control of
its Borneo possessions almost certainly will remain firm through 1960, and any
nationalist feelings that may stir probably will be dealt with by small
concessions.
51. The Chinese
population will be a target for Chinese propaganda and subversion, and some
Chinese, particularly the younger, can be expected to develop a sympathetic
attitude toward Mao’s China. However, the British-led police and constabulary
in the area almost certainly will be able to prevent serious disturbances.
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